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Livestock diseases have devastating consequences economically, socially and
politically across the globe. In certain systems, pathogens remain viable after
host death, which enables residual transmissions from infected carcasses.
Rapid culling and carcass disposal are well-established strategies for stamp-
ing out an outbreak and limiting its impact; however, wait-times for these
procedures, i.e. response delays, are typically farm-specific and time-varying
due to logistical constraints. Failing to incorporate variable response delays in
epidemiological models may understate outbreak projections and mislead
management decisions. We revisited the 2001 foot-and-mouth epidemic in
the United Kingdom and sought to understand howmisrepresented response
delays can influence model predictions. Survival analysis identified farm size
and control demand as key factors that impeded timely culling and disposal
activities on individual farms. Using these factors in the context of an existing
policy to predict local variation in response times significantly affected predic-
tions at the national scale. Models that assumed fixed, timely responses
grossly underestimated epidemic severity and its long-term consequences.
As a result, this study demonstrates how general inclusion of response
dynamics and recognition of partial controllability of interventions can help
inform management priorities during epidemics of livestock diseases.1. Introduction
Despite growing international participation in a concerted effort to prevent
notifiable livestock diseases [1,2], mass outbreaks continue to occur globally,
causing significant losses to both national economies and human lives as well
as concerns over animal welfare. In recent examples, the 2000 Saudi Arabia out-
break of Rift Valley fever (RVF) led to a more than 40% reduction in trade value
in sub-Saharan African regions [3]. Recurrences of foot-and-mouth disease
(FMD) outbreaks in FMD-free countries incur an annual cost of US$1.5 billion
worldwide and an order of magnitude more in endemic countries [4,5].
Pandemic influenza A H1N1, aided by intercontinental pig trade, was respon-
sible for an enormous human death toll in Asia and Africa [6]. Many animal
health services and protocols designed to control livestock disease spread
have been shown to underperform relative to management expectations [7,8].
Meanwhile, protracted implementations of outbreak response policies (e.g. live-
stock culling, heavy trade restrictions) have led to strong public opposition





































1 The emergence and spread of livestock diseases are expec-
ted to accelerate due to climate change and increasingly
intensified agricultural practice (e.g. [11]). Thus, understand-
ing why control actions often fail to deliver the desired
outcomes remains a critical challenge in the effort to improve
future responses.
Depopulation of infected premises has been a well-estab-
lished management practice for stamping out notifiable
livestock diseases [12–14]. Imposing a short turnaround time
from notifying infection on properties to depopulating infected
areas aids in preventing an outbreak from getting out of con-
trol [15,16]. Temporary viability of pathogens after host death
raises further concern about their residual transmission poten-
tial through carcasses and fomites [17,18]. In response, control
guidelines have been strengthened to include additional,
post-culling processes of disposal (e.g. carcass burning and
rendering) and decontamination. Short completion times of
these downstream control actions would also contribute to
the provision of a strong biosecurity programme [19].
Depopulation and disposal efforts are often carried out
slowly across individual farms (see [20]). Response delays
(e.g. time from reporting infected holdings to slaughtering
the animals) can be partially attributed to logistical constraints
that exist across management infrastructures. They include
added wait-time for veterinary virologists to confirm infection
diagnoses [21], delay to legally procure labour, supplies, trans-
portation and control facilities [22], poor accessibility to
infected properties that are geographically remote [23], a short-
age of personnel and resources [24], non-compliance with
control measures stemming from monetary disputes between
the government and land occupiers seeking compensation
[9] and the unsustainability of existing control methods after
negative public reactions [19,25]. Logistical problems also
arise from positive feedback between transmission and man-
agement load. An increased strain on operational capacity
owing to the rapid spread of infection can create a growing
backlog of pending cases, with newly reported premises left
untreated for extended periods [26]. Due to this complex
‘human element’ [27] in carrying out responses to local out-
breaks, delays in interventions on targeted premises are
difficult to predict and control amid an epidemic.
Mathematical models have been critical to the development
of realistic outbreak predictions and effective intervention
strategies. Local responses are commonly modelled to follow
a predetermined schedule that is uniform across farms
within set dates (e.g. [13,28–30]). Recent simulation models
(e.g. [31,32]) incorporated more complex response processes
by accounting for hypothetical effects of resource capacity on
the local efficiencies of control operation. However, without
close examination of actual management data, the constraining
factors behind individual instances of response delay remain a
major source of uncertainty that, if misrepresented, may mis-
lead epidemic projections and the choice of optimal control
strategies.
We revisit the 2001 FMD epidemic in the UK as a case
study for response time variation during a livestock disease
outbreak. We focus our analysis on this outbreak and its
response campaign for three principal reasons. First, it was
extensively documented, thus providing fine-scale schedule
and location data on individual control actions taken.
Second, the epidemiological process (e.g. high contagiousness,
density-dependent transmission rate, farm-level control,
potential viability of infectious agents in carcasses) shareskey features with sheep scrapie, avian influenza, hog cholera,
RVF and more, allowing the results to be informative for live-
stock diseases in general. Third, the 2001 case has motivated
the development of numerous epidemiological models [33],
which we use as the basis for our present analysis.
We examined the management timeline of this historic epi-
demic and estimated the effects of general logistical factors on
culling and disposal delays to individual farms. We sub-
sequently simulated delay times within different operational
contexts and evaluated how increasingly accurate model rep-
resentations of the response process influenced outbreak
predictions. By addressing the causes and consequences of
response delays, we show how commonly neglected features
of livestock disease management may affect management
expectations and how incorporating these features in models
can better predict future outbreaks.2. Methods
We used individual farm records collected by the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs during the 2001 FMD out-
break in the UK. The line list contains premises identifiers in the
form of county-parish-holding (CPH) number, the coordinates of
the farmhouse, UK grid reference, date of infection report, end
date and hour of slaughter, end date and hour of carcass disposal
and the number of livestock (cattle, pigs, sheep and goats). We
focused our analysis of response delays on only the premises
initially identified as infected (IP) and culled to limit viral
excretion. This excludes ‘at-risk’ premises that were culled pre-
emptively for being in direct, dangerous contacts with IPs
(DC), contiguous to IPs (contiguous premises, CP), in neighbour-
hood of IPs (3–5 km rings) or suspicious (slaughter-on-suspicion,
SOS), but did not test positive for the virus. These premises were
excluded because the initial date of the decision to cull was not
recorded. We also included in our analysis farms that were
initially considered ‘at-risk’ but were later reclassified as IP
(e.g. 162/8196 of DC, 71/335 of SOS) with known infection
report dates. 171 out of 2021 entries whose date fields were
incomplete or inconsistent with the sequence of report–
slaughter–disposal were discarded from analysis. For premises
composed of multiple parcels or fragments of land that share
the same CPH numbers, we aggregated livestock quantity and
response times for large parcels (containing 50 animals or
more) and discounted entries for small, remnant parcels. From
this processed dataset, we calculated the time intervals between
report-to-culling completion (defined as culling delay) and cul-
ling completion to disposal completion (defined as disposal
delay) in fractional days for each infected farm, e.g. perfect com-
pliance with the national policy to depopulate IPs under 24 h of
report would nevertheless return a positive culling delay that
equals the number of operational hours in unit days. Activities
that were recorded without hourly information were set to
occur at midnight at the start of the recorded day.
To identify key logistical constraints, we applied survival
analysis to the culling and disposal delays using Cox pro-
portional hazards regression, implemented using the R
package coxme [34]. We explored the logistical effects of three
candidate covariates: farm size, control demand and farm den-
sity. Farm size counts all livestock on the farm to be culled, in
units of one hundred. It is possible that highly populated pre-
mises experience longer response times due to a positive
relationship between the number of animals handled and
labour hours [35]. Control demand measures the national
number of premises that are scheduled for control, in units of
ten. This relates to the backlog of farms awaiting control at a par-





































1 [22,36]. In our analysis of culling delay, the demand covariate tal-
lies pending cases (i.e. infected premises that are not yet culled)
on the day of the focal farm’s case report. Alternatively, in the
analysis of disposal delay, the demand covariate tallies premises
pending disposal (i.e. culled but with carcasses remaining) on the
day of the focal farm’s culling completion. We note that these
measures use IP caseload as a proxy of the overall demand on
the response system, excluding pre-emptive culls and disposals
that lack explicit documentation of time in-and-out of the control
queue. Farm density is defined as the number of IPs in units of
ten within a geographical neighbourhood of 5 km radius,
which we computed using the R package spatstat [37]. Cluster-
ing of farms is correlated with infection risk [13], but it may
also influence the accessibilities of remote, isolated premises
and their management priorities, leading to variable response
times. County membership was assigned as a random effect,
which allows us to account for regional variation in operational
conditions and management practices. In addition, we ran separ-
ate regression analyses on farms that were reported before
(N = 830) and on or after (N = 970) 1 April, close to when the
national control policy was strengthened by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) with a target schedule
of culling IPs and associated ‘at-risk’ farms within 24 and 48 h
of case reporting, respectively.
In order to assess the epidemiological impacts of realistic
response times, we simulated FMD outbreaks subject to con-
text-dependent control actions. The durations of delay were
generated according to the method of inverse probability integral
transform [38]. The baseline hazard assumed the commonly used
Weibull distribution, which offers flexibility in modelling a var-
iety of survival data [39]; its shape and scale parameters k and
λ, respectively, were estimated via model fitting using the R pack-
age flexsurv [40]. Delay time T is a random variable distributed
as a conditional survival function derived from the proportional
hazards regression model. Each realization was obtained
by computing




with v a uniform variate on (0,1), x is a vector of covariates (i.e.
farm size, control demand, farm density) and β is the logarithm
of their corresponding hazard ratios (HRs), which measures the
relative change in hazard rate as the value of a covariate increases.
The censoring time was set uniformly at the maximal recorded
value (42 days). We then tested our delay predictions by applying
parametric bootstrap based on estimations of mean HRs of key
covariates from 2000 simulations replicates, each generated 1000
delays using covariate values randomly sampled from the national
data. The mean HRs from our predictions were then evaluated
against the empirical estimates.
We integrated the predicted response delays into the well-
established Warwick model [27,41–44]. The model includes
spatially explicit representation of registered farms and their live-
stock compositions. It treats the farm as the basic unit for
infection and susceptibility, such that all the animals in each
holding become infected en masse. The parameters are fitted to
the incidence data from 2001 and account for nonlinear increases
of farm-level transmission and susceptibility as a function of
farm size. Here, we extended the model description of control
actions to include the disposal process, carcass transmission
rate, and variable culling and disposal delays that equate to an
individual farm’s wait-times in the control queues. The viral
excretion ratio between living and dead animals in FMD has
been seldom investigated; for the purpose of this analysis, we
assumed that the carcass transmission rate was 10% of the base-
line rate established prior to culling. As we are principally
interested in the predictive differences resulting from the intro-
duction of response delays rather than a recreation of the 2001outbreak, the original model was not reparametrized under
these new features.
We considered a general scenario where only IPs and DCs are
targeted for removal. Two operational settings were explored: the
time-independent response predicts delays using a set of HRs esti-
mated over the entire epidemic timeline; the time-dependent
response accounts for the effect of the policy change and uses sep-
arate sets of HR estimates, one limited to farms reported before 1
April and the other to those reported afterwards. We compared
their epidemic outcomes to simulation runs under two alternative
delay scenarios: (i) idealized response characterized by constant,
uniform delays, such that culling is completed under 24 h for IP
and 48 h for DC, and disposal is completed under 24 h for IP
and 24 h for DC, to reflect the target response time for culling
adopted by MAFF and a conservative ideal for disposal response
times given that there was no national policy for disposal delay;
(ii) approximated response, in which case delays are drawn ran-
domly from IP empirical distributions and an extra 24 h is
added to DC culls to adjust for their later occurrences. The latter
scenario reflects the true distribution of delays, but not the
observed correlations between covariates and delay times.3. Results
The culling and disposal delays of IPs in the 2001 FMD out-
break were highly variable, and frequently longer than the
operational recommendations of 24 h issued on 1 April
(figure 1). The delays were notably long (culling: 2.67 days;
disposal: 3.45 days) prior to the epidemic peak in late
March (figure 1b,c) despite the initially low number of IPs
(figure 1a) and relatively low operational demand on either
control effort (electronic supplementary material, figure
S1b,c). The mean culling delay increased around late Febru-
ary and then steadily declined until mid-April (figure 1c).
The disposal delay was highest at the start of the outbreak,
and decreased dramatically in late April (figure 1c),
coinciding with the epidemic being brought under control
(figure 1a). When the 24 h culling policy was implemented
after 1 April, these declined to 1.46 and 1.8 days, respectively.
The longest recorded delays (culling: 40.6 days on 10 March;
disposal: 41.5 days on 17 March) occurred at the start of the
epidemic (figure 1b). The number of farms that experienced
delays exceeding one week decreased as well after 1 April
(for culling: 31–4; for disposal: 58–55). There was no corre-
lation between the culling and disposal delays on
individual farms (ρ = 0.07). Disposal delays approximate a
long-tail distribution (inset in figure 1c), such that a wait-
time exceeding 3 days (34.9% of disposal activities compared
with 9.4% of culls) was as probable as less than 1 day (34.6%
of disposal activities compared with 23.9% of culls). This par-
tially reflects two distinct management phases: after 24 April,
disposal activities, which previously consumed more oper-
ation time (3.21 ± 0.08 days delay) than culling activities
(2.23 ± 0.06 days delay), were observed to be markedly
more efficient (0.53 ± 0.03 day delay compared with 1.35 ±
0.05 day delay) (figure 1c). In other words, before late
April, infected live animals were kept on IPs for a long
time and their carcasses for longer; after this period, depopu-
lation of IPs tended to happen more quickly and carcass
disposal quicker still.
Cox proportional hazards regression models revealed that
the size of infected farms was positively correlated (p < 0.01)
with both the culling and disposal delays at the individual
farm level (table 1). We note that the size of infected farms
0
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Figure 1. Temporal variations in response delays on IPs during the 2001 foot-and-mouth epidemic in the UK. (a) Incidence time-series based on daily national case
reports. (b) Delay intervals from infection report to culling ( purple) and from culling to disposal (green) for each farm with respect to its report date. Illustration






































1 was consistent nationally throughout the entire epidemic
(electronic supplementary material, figure S1a). Overall,
with control demand and farm density held constant at
mean values, an addition of 100 livestock reduces the daily
rates of their respective activities by factors of 0.966 (that is,
a decline of 3.7%) and 0.978 (2.2%) on average. Estimation
of survival functions for farms grouped by size also showed
as much as a 109% increase in the chances that local interven-
tion remained incomplete after 48 h if the premises contains
500 livestock or more (electronic supplementary material,
figure S2). A comparison of HRs summarized in table 1
found that the effects of farm size on both control measures
were in qualitative agreement between the two subdivided
time frames before and starting on 1 April. When the effects
of control demand were evaluated over the full epidemic
timeline, they correlated with drops in both culling and
disposal efficiencies. In common with farm size, control
demand constrained culling activities more heavily than it
did for disposal activities. For every 10 pending actions, the
daily culling rate was reduced by a factor of 0.87 (a decrease
of 13%) and the daily disposal rate by 0.916 (8.4%) (table 1).
However, for farms reported prior to 1 April, increased
levels of control demand did not produce a statistically sig-
nificant change to the durations of their disposal delay.
Furthermore, culling delay was notably shortened withrising control demand, contrary to our expectation that
wait-time would be lengthened when operational capacity
is under increased strain. While counterintuitive, this result
suggests that culling operations prior to policy reinforcement
may have been delayed predominantly by factors related to
management ‘awareness’, i.e. initially slow reaction to contain
the outbreak when reports were scarce, instead of by caseload
competition. The number of neighbouring IPs, i.e. farm den-
sity, was also consistent over time (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1d), but unlike farm size, its operational
impacts were in general found to be statistically insignificant
(table 1). Only prior to 1 April did the covariate show a mod-
erately significant effect, when an addition of 10 infected
neighbours within a 5 km radius increased daily culling rate
by a factor of 1.087 (8.7%).
Model comparison using the likelihood-ratio tests further
supported farm size and control demand as significant
contributing factors of response delays (electronic sup-
plementary material, table S1). In our ‘policy agnostic’
analysis under the time-independent response, we predicted
delays conditional on both covariates; the same applies when
we assume different hazard rates before and after 1 April
under the time-dependent response, with the exception of
the disposal of farms reported before 1 April, which is mod-
elled to be delayed independent of control demand.
Table 1. Survival analysis of response delays on infected premises (IPs). 1 April 2001 represents the date on which national control policy was strengthened by
the inclusion of a 24 h target window for culling IPs following case report.
case report date factor
culling delay disposal delay
hazard ratio (95% CI) p-value hazard ratio (95% CI) p-value
before 1 April farm size 0.973 (0.963–0.984) 0.00 0.984 (0.973–0.994) 0.002
control demand 1.183 (1.132–1.235) 0.00 0.988 (0.973–1.004) 0.14
farm density 1.087 (1.020–1.159) 0.011 0.968 (0.903–1.039) 0.37
on or after 1 April farm size 0.957 (0.947–0.968) 0.00 0.977 (0.968–0.987) 0.00
control demand 0.883 (0.848–0.921) 0.00 0.889 (0.876–0.902) 0.00
farm density 1.031 (0.974–1.093) 0.29 1.012 (0.949–1.078) 0.73
entire timeline farm size 0.966 (0.959–0.973) 0.00 0.978 (0.971–0.985) 0.00
control demand 0.870 (0.852–0.889) 0.00 0.916 (0.907–0.926) 0.00
farm density 1.041 (0.997–1.086) 0.07 0.952 (0.909–0.998) 0.041
Table 2. Comparisons between the recorded and the predicted delays on infected premises (IPs). Left data column: survival analysis using mostly two-factors
Cox proportional hazards regression models for IPs reported across the specified epidemic timeline. Right data column: parametric bootstrap analysis using
predictions generated with resampled covariate values.
factor case report date
from the recorded delays from the predicted delays
hazard ratio (95% CI) p-value mean hazard ratio (s.d.)
culling farm size entire timeline 0.965 (0.958–0.973) 0.00 0.965 (0.001)
before 1 April 0.972 (0.962–0.983) 0.00 0.972 (0.002)
on or after 1 April 0.957 (0.946–0.967) 0.00 0.957 (0.002)
control demand entire timeline 0.873 (0.855–0.891) 0.00 0.872 (0.013)
before 1 April 1.180 (1.130–1.231) 0.00 1.180 (0.017)
on or after 1 April 0.885 (0.849–0.923) 0.00 0.885 (0.017)
disposal farm size entire timeline 0.979 (0.972–0.986) 0.00 0.979 (0.001)
before 1 April 0.984 (0.974–0.995) 0.003 0.984 (0.002)
on or after 1 April 0.977 (0.968–0.987) 0.00 0.977 (0.001)
control demand entire timeline 0.916 (0.906–0.925) 0.00 0.915 (0.006)
before 1 April 0.988 (0.973–1.004) 0.15 —





































1 Parametric bootstrap and graphical inspections showed that
our delay predictions captured the general properties (effect
size and direction) of the observed data (table 2; electronic
supplementary material, figures S3 and S4).
When variable culling and disposal delays on individual
farms based on logistical factors and control policy are included
in the Warwick FMD simulation model, we observed changes
in the epidemic profile as well as significant differences in the
overall epidemic size, quantified here by the total numbers
of animals and farms (i.e. combination of IPs and DCs)
culled (figure 2a–d). On the other hand, the durations of the
epidemics were not markedly affected, which averaged
between 305 and 332 days across all four management scenarios
(figure 2d).
Simulations that include response times as a function of
farm size, control demand and policy timeframes, i.e. time-
dependent response, generally led to (i) steeper initial epi-
demic growth, (ii) earlier epidemic peaks and (iii) larger peak
sizes. We also observed more frequent recurrences of smalloutbreaks toward the end of the epidemic (figure 2a–c).
Assuming an idealized response process, exactly consistent
with the policy recommendation from the start, results in the
lowest number of animals and farms targeted for depopulation
(approx. 59% of the maximum expected values), the slowest
growth rate and typically fewest daily infections throughout
the epidemic (figure 2a,d ). Ignoring the different delay patterns
before and after the reinforcement of control guideline on 1
April, i.e. time-independent response, generated slower
increases in daily incidence and reductions in epidemic size
(figure 2b,d). The trajectories of incidence decline are largely
consistent with those under the time-dependent response. By
contrast, drawing random delay times from the empirical
delays irrespective of policy and logistical constraints results
in incidence time-series that more closely follow the operation-
ally informed predictions from the time-dependent response,
particularly during the growth phase of the epidemic, but is
also characterized by slower deceleration after the peak
(figure 2c). Overall, under the random delay time scenario,
100 200 300 400 500
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Figure 2. Simulations of daily FMD incidence time-series and overall management success in the extended Warwick model with variable culling and disposal delays
on individual farms. The reference dynamics, shown in black (a–c), represent epidemic profiles conditional on locally heterogeneous delays as a function of farm size,
control demand and policy timeframes (time-dependent response). The resulting dynamics of fixed, idealized response (a) and randomly drawn, approximated
responses (c) are shown in green and blue, respectively. The time-series in orange (b) illustrate the changes in the dynamical pattern after removing the
1 April policy reinforcement factor from model description (time-independent response). Two hundred simulations were run per model, each initialized at 1 February
2001 and continued until disease elimination. The management outcomes of the model responses are shown in corresponding colours using violin plots (d ) under





































1 the distributions of animals and farms culled have slightly
higher means and smaller variances compared to the results
under the time-dependent response (figure 2d ).4. Discussion
Our statistical analysis of times between infection reports,
culling completion and disposal completion during the
2001 FMD outbreak in the UK showed significant farm-
level variation in response delays. Response delays were
initially long, but shortened over time with the intensification
of control measures and the decline in disease incidence.
Nevertheless, culling delays on IPs generally failed to meet
the specified 24 h target. Efforts to depopulate several IPs
were delayed for more than two weeks. Under strict move-
ment restriction, this would not only raise concerns over
animal welfare, but may substantially add to the overall econ-
omic cost due to the increased risks of mass welfare culls [45].
In addition, long culling delays may promote recurrent out-
breaks in formerly controlled regions [46] and long-distance
airborne spread if they occur during particular atmospheric
conditions [47]. Compared to culling, the response times for
carcass disposal were considerably longer during the early
phase of the epidemic before they abruptly shortened inlate April. In a general outbreak of livestock disease, a similar
pattern of slow control action downstream to culling (e.g.
carcass removal) during the peak epidemic period could
potentially undermine the management objectives.
Survival analysis of response times shows a dependency of
culling and disposal delays on temporal and demographic
variables. In particular, farm size, measured by livestock quan-
tity, correlated positively with both types of delays, suggesting
a tradeoff between the scale and the efficiency of control at the
individual farm level. Slower response to large farms raises a
potentially important concern for global agribusiness and live-
stock production: while large farming units may yield higher
productivity, they could also create a logistical bottleneck for
control actions in the event of an outbreak. This adverse
effect further suggests that large farms not only have a domi-
nating role in the risk of onward transmission [48,49], but may
also increase the potential for pathogen exposure on suscep-
tible premises due to infective hosts (i.e. live animals or
carcasses) being kept longer onsite. Future management
strategies may thus be able to slow epidemic growth by
prioritizing the treatments of farms with high livestock counts.
Increased control demand, represented by the accumu-
lation of untreated cases and farms not yet disposed, was
found to create significant operational delays for the majority





































1 that accelerates epidemic spread may concurrently hinder local
containment effort, complicating the management challenges.
This dynamical interaction further suggests a positive feed-
back between management and disease spread: lagged
responses to infected farms increase transmission opportu-
nities, which results in greater number of infections and
more belated responses. Therefore, response delays at earlier
stages of an epidemic can be compounded into longer delays
at later stages along the epidemic curve, which is consistent
with previously observed patterns of large-scale FMD inter-
vention [22]. This management implication reinforces the
importance of allocating sufficient resources toward pre-emp-
tive responses such as disease prevention (e.g. national
prophylactic vaccination campaigns) and surveillance, and
expeditious control actions early on in the outbreak. Given
that control demands and delay times are fundamentally
uncertain before a response is initiated, planning of response
might consider strategies that are robust to these uncertainties
initially [33], but can adapt once the operational load is known
and the associated delays are realized [50].
Contrary to expectation, infected farm density (i.e. number
of neighbouring IPs) did not appear to strongly affect the
speed of either stage of control action. This result, in
combination with the effect of farm size, may inform the devel-
opment of more protective farming practices against epidemics
of livestock diseases. For instance, as many countries move
further towards industrialization and urbanization, land pol-
icies that favour a dense distribution of small farms over a
sparse distribution of large operations may enable more expe-
dited intervention in the event of an outbreak. However,
spatial clustering promotes epidemic spread [51]; hence, plan-
ning for outbreak response conditional on the landscape-level
distribution of farms of different sizes will allow a more tai-
lored response to outbreaks when they occur. The generality
of these logistical effects and their practical applications is an
area we intend to study in the future.
Few models of epidemic management in livestock popu-
lations have attempted to explicitly account for variable
response delays as a function of logistical factors. Early predic-
tions of outbreak and management success were commonly
made on the assumptions of spatially uniform or time-invar-
iant delay. In recent years, individual-based simulations
introduced logistical constraint by limiting the number of
daily control actions [30,52,53]. While this description accounts
for control demand and allows different delays when there is an
excess number of target premises, the control capacity is often
determined arbitrarily and unaffected by the number of animals
on individual farms. Large-scale, stochastic livestock models
such as AusSpread [54], AADIS (Australian Animal Disease
Spread) [55], NAADSM (North American Animal Disease
Spread Model) [56] and InterSpread Plus [57] are capable of
modelling spatially heterogeneous response delay, but the
embedded delay functions have typically been underpinned
by expert opinions instead of empirical data. Compartmental
models fitted to historic outbreak data [20,58] have predicted
alternative time-series of known epidemics when they
assumed different distributions of response times. However,
the durations of delay were not explicitly linked to farm attri-
butes or disease dynamics. A recent model of human disease
by Tao et al. [59] combines a spatial compartmental model
with an individual-based simulation to describe a more realistic
response process regulated by spatio-temporally varying logis-
tical constraints—drained resources and high density of controltargets confer extensive delay in the local response. The
model’s ability to inform the management of livestock disease
outbreaks is nevertheless limited; its assumption of identical
control units omits demographic heterogeneity that may be
used to describe important farm-level variations in enclosure
capacity, holding practices and species compositions, among
other covariates.
Our simulations explicitly account for the timeliness of
individual control actions and integrate disease dynamics
with management dynamics at both the local and national
levels. By simulating epidemic scenarios under different
descriptions of response delays using the Warwick model,
we demonstrated that misrepresenting response efficiencies
may lead to biased outbreak projections. The assumption of
idealized delays predicted the lowest epidemic impacts on a
national scale. Thus, an optimistic assumption of universally
prompt responses would drastically underestimate the mag-
nitude of the resulting outbreak. Accounting for realistic
logistical constraints and a policy timeline based on observed
lags resulted in more severe outbreak projections. The range
of predictable outcomes further depends on the model’s
capacity to recognize, isolate and quantify patterns of
early-stage intervention that may comprise slow, under-
coordinated responses to initial detections amidst a novel
outbreak. Interestingly, when we sampled case-specific
delays randomly from their full empirical distributions with-
out any operational knowledge, we were able to approximate
the outbreak dynamics generated by the most informed
model, suggesting that an assumption of variable delays
alone may enhance model prediction even in the absence of
spatial or temporal details. This alternative model, a poten-
tially convenient approach for retroactive data analyses, is
nevertheless impractical to adopt in real-time forecasts;
when the complete pattern of operational delays has not yet
emerged, it may support an oversampling of early response
times and conceal the operational reality that becomes appar-
ent only during later stages of intervention. In general, the
overall epidemic severity increases with the level of variation
we incorporate into model responses.
The direction and magnitude of forecast bias may lead to
sub-optimal management recommendations when comparing
culling-based interventions to, for example, frequently debated
vaccination-based interventions [33,60]. The degree to which
these biases will result in incorrect management recommen-
dations is beyond the scope of this analysis; however, this
work highlights the importance of accounting for operational,
as well as epidemiological, uncertainties and their potential
impact on management recommendations as well as epidemic
forecasts [61]. The measures our simulation used for predicting
management outcomes (i.e. total animals and farms infected,
epidemic duration) commonly represent conflicting, difficult-
to-resolve objectives between policy makers and multiple sta-
keholders [48,53]. Therefore, resolving uncertainties in local
response delay can also potentially reduce the need for time-
consuming debates on management strategies by meeting
multiple objectives at once.
While top-down policy reinforcement is critical to overall
management success, our results emphasize the additional
need for policy makers to base their expectations of response
efficiency on realistic logistical constraints. The impacts of
logistical constraints may be magnified in countries defi-
cient in economic, diagnostic and operational capacity.





































1 decomposing carcasses and be capable of airborne propa-
gation, then the risk of extensive delays during mass
disposal may raise even greater concerns [62]. Therefore,
quantitative assessment of control logistics during novel out-
breaks can be invaluable in the development of appropriate
intervention strategies, including optimal resource allocation
and pre-emptive planning. Providing rapid operations
research in tandem with epidemiological observations
allows management to better anticipate needs ahead.
Our current study can be extended such that each new case
report is weighted according to the number of days it remains
untreated in that period, giving a possiblymore realistic descrip-
tion of control demand adjusted for urgency. We may also
evaluate response delay relative to different temporal bound-
aries: incorporating the start dates of a control action enables
measurements of (i) the delay to initiate desired action and
(ii) the amount of time spent on said action, from which we
can calculate finer-scale patterns such as variation in local hand-
ling time per animal. Given that the aim of our study is not to
recreate the 2001 outbreak, our analysis uses IP as proxy for con-
trol demandwithoutmodelling the scheduling effects ofDC/CP
and other culls. However, similar pre-emptive controlmeasures,
including concurrent vaccinations (aswasused in the 2001 FMD
outbreak in The Netherlands), might be considered in future
studies that intend to characterize the entirety of an operational
backlog (see [32]).We note that responsewait-timesmay also be
strongly shapedby farm-level covariatesnot explored inour sur-
vival analysis, including elevation, species composition (e.g. the
ratios of sheep to cow) andaccessibilitymeasuredby the shortest
distance to the nearest road. Our study assumes no supplemen-
tation of resource with increasing caseload, yet conceivably the
latter might trigger ‘stronger’ responses in the forms of new
financial commitment made to control programmes, resource
reallocation and other changes in operational capacity over
time. Therefore, global covariates such as the amount ofavailable resources (e.g. personnel, funding, public support)
and the number of epidemic foci may also be useful to consider.
Investigating the logistical impacts of these covariates will
broaden our understanding of context-dependent delay and
help tailor management strategies to particular disease systems
and geographical regions.
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